



PASSWORDS – YOU’RE DOING IT ALL WRONG!

We're following Best Practices for password construction, storage, etc. But what if the Best Practices are WRONG?

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Authentication

Provide Identity
Prove Identity
 Something you **KNOW**
 Something you **HAVE**
 Something you **ARE**
 Some**WHERE** you are



Password History

Goes back ages ...

Well before WWII But we'll start there:

IFF (Identify Friend or Foe)

Challenge / Response

"flash" / "thunder"

Cricket Clicker

only as good as its ability to remain a secret





MY

favorite password

TigGer99





Breaches you were pwned in

A "breach" is an incident where data has been unintentionally exposed to the public. Using the 1Password password manager helps you ensure all your passwords are strong and unique such that a breach of one service doesn't put your other services at risk.



Adobe: In October 2013, 153 million Adobe accounts were breached with each containing an internal ID, username, email, *encrypted* password and a password hint in plain text. The password cryptography was poorly done and many were quickly resolved back to plain text. The unencrypted hints also disclosed much about the passwords adding further to the risk that hundreds of millions of Adobe customers already faced.

Compromised data: Email addresses, Password hints, Passwords, Usernames



Anti Public Combo List (unverified): In December 2016, a huge list of email address and password pairs appeared in a "combo list" referred to as "Anti Public". The list contained 458 million unique email addresses, many with multiple different passwords hacked from various online systems. The list was broadly circulated and used for "credential stuffing", that is attackers employ it in an attempt to identify other online systems where the account owner had reused their password. For detailed background on this incident, read [Password reuse, credential stuffing and another billion records in Have I Been Pwned](#).

Compromised data: Email addresses, Passwords



B2B USA Businesses (spam list): In mid-2017, a spam list of over 105 million individuals in corporate America was discovered online. Referred to as "B2B USA Businesses", the list categorised email addresses by employer, providing information on individuals' job titles plus their work phone numbers and physical addresses. Read [more about spam lists in HIBP](#).

Compromised data: Email addresses, Employers, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Physical addresses



CafePress: In February 2019, the custom merchandise retailer CafePress suffered a data breach. The exposed data included 23 million unique email addresses with some records also containing names, physical addresses, phone numbers and passwords stored as SHA-1 hashes. The data was provided to HIBP by a source who requested it be attributed to "JimScott.Sec@protonmail.com".

Compromised data: Email addresses, Names, Passwords, Phone numbers, Physical addresses



Data Enrichment Exposure From PDL Customer: In October 2019, security researchers Vinny Troia and Bob Diachenko identified an unprotected Elasticsearch server holding 1.2 billion records of personal data. The exposed data included an index indicating it was sourced from data enrichment company People Data Labs (PDL) and contained 622 million unique email addresses. The server was not owned by PDL and it's believed a customer failed to properly secure the database. Exposed information included email addresses, phone numbers, social media profiles and job history data.

Compromised data: Email addresses, Employers, Geographic locations, Job titles, Names, Phone numbers, Social media profiles



Evite: In April 2019, the social planning website for managing online invitations Evite identified a data breach of their systems. Upon investigation, they found unauthorised access to a database archive dating back to 2013. The exposed data included a total of 101 million unique email addresses, most belonging to recipients of invitations. Members of the service also had names, phone numbers, physical addresses, dates of birth, genders and passwords stored in plain text exposed. The data was provided to HIBP by a source who requested it be attributed to "JimScott.Sec@protonmail.com".

Compromised data: Dates of birth, Email addresses, Genders, Names, Passwords, Phone numbers, Physical addresses



River City Media Spam List (spam list): In January 2017, a massive trove of data from River City Media was found exposed online. The data was found to contain almost 1.4 billion records including email and IP addresses, names and physical addresses, all of which was used as part of an enormous spam operation. Once de-duplicated, there were 393 million unique email addresses within the exposed data.

Compromised data: Email addresses, IP addresses, Names, Physical addresses



Trillian: In December 2015, the instant messaging application Trillian suffered a data breach. The breach became known in July 2016 and exposed various personal data attributes including names, email addresses and passwords stored as salted MD5 hashes.

Compromised data: Dates of birth, Email addresses, IP addresses, Names, Passwords, Usernames



Verifications.io: In February 2019, the email address validation service verifications.io suffered a data breach. Discovered by Bob Diachenko and Vinny Troia, the breach was due to the data being stored in a MongoDB instance left publicly facing without a password and resulted in 763 million unique email addresses being exposed. Many records within the data also included additional personal attributes such as names, phone



AND Our Password Rules

Minimum of 6 characters

Maximum of 12 characters

Contain 3 of 4 character types

Upper	lower
numbers	Special

Change every 90 days (30 for admins)

DON'T RE-USE last 8 passwords

AND Our Password Rules

Minimum of ~~X~~ ~~XXX~~ **12** CHARACTERS

Maximum of ~~XX~~ **20** CHARACTERS

Contain 3 of 4 character types

Upper	lower
numbers	Special

Change every 90 days (30 for admins)

DON'T RE-USE last 8 passwords


My favorite password


TigGer99



**“MUCH OF WHAT I
DID I NOW REGRET.”**

BILL BURR, FORMER NIST MANAGER





Our Password Rules

Minimum of 8 characters

Maximum of 12 characters

Contain 3 of 4 character types

Upper	lower
numbers	Special

Change every 90 days (30 for admins)

DON'T RE-USE last 8 passwords

Password Cracking

Cleartext

<https://plaintextoffenders.com/>

Hashed

On/Offline dictionary attacks

Rainbow tables

GPUs

Adaptive algorithms / salts



Our Password Rules

~~Minimum of 8 characters~~

~~Maximum of 12 characters~~

Contain 3 of 4 character types


Upper lower

numbers Special

Change every 90 days (30 for admins)

DON'T RE-USE last 8 passwords

xkcd (2011)



THROUGH 20 YEARS OF EFFORT, WE'VE SUCCESSFULLY TRAINED EVERYONE TO USE PASSWORDS THAT ARE HARD FOR HUMANS TO REMEMBER, BUT EASY FOR COMPUTERS TO GUESS.

Image: xkcd

Password Space

Password space = x^n

X = possibilities for one "character"

n = number of characters

8 numerical: $10^8 = 100,000,000$ or 1×10^8

8 alphanumeric: $36^8 = 2.8 \times 10^{12}$

8 mixed alphanumeric: $72^8 = 7.2 \times 10^{14}$

12 mixed alphanumeric: $72^{12} = 1.9 \times 10^{22}$

4 words = $40,000^4 = 2.56 \times 10^{18}$

According to lexicographer and dictionary expert Susie Dent, "the **average** active **vocabulary** of an adult **English speaker** is around 20,000 **words**, while his passive **vocabulary** is around 40,000 **words**."

4 Words

Let's go big and attack the XKCD password instructions of four random english words to create a new password **'sourceinterfacesgatheredartists'**. This addition of one more word just drastically increased our keyspace to 10,000,000,000,000,000 candidates, but just like the previous attacks it will fall, mostly because of us using MD5 as the hashing function. Again we will use our newly created 'combined' dictionary twice and tell Hashcat to perform a combo attack:

Example

hashcat -a 1 -m 0 hash.txt google-10000-combined.txt google-10000-combined.txt

```
02f2015da664edf15307194dd97e19b7:sourceinterfacesgatheredartists
Session.....: hashcat
Status.....: Cracked
Hash.Type.....: MD5
Hash.Target.....: 02f2015da664edf15307194dd97e19b7
Time.Started....: Sun Jan  1 18:14:23 2017 (5 hours, 35 mins)
Time.Estimated...: Sun Jan  1 23:49:52 2017 (0 secs)
```

This cracking attempt could have taken 4 days to complete, using modern hardware, but luckily we found the candidate just 5hrs 35mins into the cracking session. Simple modifications to this password like numbers or special characters in the middle would have made this password beyond our reach but again random common words is no match.

Our Password Rules

~~Minimum of 8 characters~~

~~Maximum of 12 characters~~

~~Contain 3 of 4 character types~~

~~— Upper — lower~~

~~— numbers — Special~~

Change every 90 days (30 for admins)

DON'T RE-USE last 8 passwords

My favorite password

~~TigGer99~~

~~TigGer10~~

~~TiaGer11~~



Our Password Rules

~~Minimum of 8 characters~~

~~Maximum of 12 characters~~

~~Contain 3 of 4 character types~~

~~— Upper — lower~~

~~— numbers — Special~~

~~Change every 90 days (30 for admins)~~

~~DON'T RE-USE last 8 passwords~~

Our Password Rules

~~Minimum of 8 characters~~
~~Maximum of 12 characters~~
~~Contain 3 of 4 character types~~
~~— Upper — lower~~
~~— numbers — Special~~
~~Change every 90 days (30 for admins)~~
~~DON'T RE-USE last 8 passwords~~

NIST Password Rules

Minimum of 8 characters: NIST 800-63B still says this
~~Maximum of 12:~~ Max of AT LEAST 64 characters
 Change every 30/60/90 days: Doesn't ban
 Contain 3 of 4 character types : Doesn't ban
 UPPER, LOWER, numerical, special
 DON'T RE-USE last x passwords: Doesn't ban

NIST Additions

Restrict sequential/repetitive (1234, aaaa)

Restrict context passwords

e.g., username / sitename

Restrict dictionary / common

scott/tiger, sa/sa, admin/password

Restrict previously breached <https://haveibeenpwned.com>

Our Recommendations

2 factor (**not** SMS)

Time-based one-time Password (TOTP) (Authenticator, RSA, DUO)

Cryptographic challenge/response (yubi-key, DUO)

NO CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS

MIN 12 CHARACTERS/NO MAX

NO EXPIRATION UNLESS LOSS SUSPECTED

NO PREVIOUS BREACH/SIMPLE PASSWORDS

PREFER Passphrase

I only regret that I have but one life to lose for my country.

USE Password Manager (Keepass, LastPass, OnePass)

Lockout + Alerts

last login, failed, change, etc



Oh the places we'll go

Troy hunt

<https://www.troyhunt.com/passwords-evolved-authentication-guidance-for-the-modern-era/>

National institute of standards and Technology (NIST)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Institute_of_Standards_and_Technology

National security center (NSC)

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Cyber_Security_Centre_\(United_Kingdom\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Cyber_Security_Centre_(United_Kingdom))

Microsoft

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Microsoft_Password_Guidance-1.pdf

QUESTIONS?

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